Corruption in the health sector in South Africa and India. by Pillay, Pregala & Mantzaris, A.
African Journal of Public Affairs48
Corruption in the Health Sector 
in South Africa and India
Some Considerations and Reflections
P Pillay and E A Mantzaris 
School of Public Leadership 
Anti-Corruption Centre for Education and Research 
Stellenbosch University
AbSTRACT
The article is an integral part of a comprehensive comparative empirical study on 
corruption in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). 
The article begins with the context and parameters of the research identifying a 
number of core concepts associated with the phenomenon. The anti-corruption 
legislation in the two aforementioned countries is presented next with South 
Africa seemingly introducing a diverse range of anti-corruption laws, rules and 
regulations that tackle almost all aspects of the phenomenon in comparison to 
India. A number of the most significant laws and instruments rele vant in the fight 
against corruption in the healthcare sector is briefly analysed. The methodology 
followed in the study combined diverse empirical approaches, such as primary 
documentary research released by the South African and Indian Treasuries 
and the Auditor-General authorities, unstructured interviews with researchers, 
 experts and government officials in both countries as well as content analysis of 
the print media. The data analysis provided the realities of fraud, corruption and 
collusion, its types and reasons for perpetration in a comparative perspective. 
The key differences between the two as revealed by the findings is that while in 
India the rampant corruption is more evident in the private sector, the opposite is 
true for South Africa. A number of explanations based on the empirical findings 
are advanced.
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AbbREvIATIONS
●● ACCC (Anti-Corruption Coordinating Committee)
●● AU (African Union)
●● BMJ (British Medical Journal)
●● FDF (Financial Disclosure Framework)
●● FICA (Financial Intelligence Centre Act)
●● NACF (Asset Forfeiture Unit, National Anti-Corruption Forum
●● NPA (National Prosecuting Authority
●● OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
●● PAIA (Promotion of Access to Information Act)
●● PAJA (Promotion of Administrative Justice Act)
●● PDA (Protected Disclosure Act)
●● POCA (Prevention of Organised Crime Act)
●● PRECCA (Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act)
●● SADC (Southern African Development Community)
●● SCM (Supply Chain Management)
●● SIU (Special Investigating Unit)
●● UNCAC (United Nations Convention against Corruption)
●● UNDP (United Nations Development Program)
●● WHO (World Health Organisation)
INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT
It can be understood that there are many human, organisational, and political reasons 
that contribute towards corruption in the health sector such as the lack of financial ac-
countability in the organisational structures and its effects on good governance, personal 
greed, imbalances in power relations in the administrative/political power in the public 
sector including salary imbalances (Vian 2008:84–85). In the public and private sectors 
including the health sector institutions, middle and lower salary groups, petty corruption 
is used as a ‘cope mechanism’ / ‘‘survival corruption’’ (Woods and Mantzaris 2012).
In all instances, the multiplicity of types depend on diverse circumstances, settings and 
rationalisations. All these dimensions need to be examined and analysed if corruption 
is to be fought effectively, efficiently and decisively. In such situations fraud and abuse 
is the rule (European Commission 2013:4–5).
The health sector, especially has been faced with the corruption conundrum because 
massive sums of public funds, especially in low and middle income countries, find their 
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way into the pockets of a wide range of corrupt politicians, administrators, private and 
public health providers and professionals, suppliers and other service providers. It is a 
very vulnerable sector (Samuel & Frisancho 2015:126–127). Internationally, the situation 
with corruption in the health sector is replete with ‘grey areas’, but scientific calculations 
have provided certain knowledge which point towards the immensity of the phenomenon. 
In the USA, for example, the country’s Attorney-General asserted that corruption in the 
health sectors is the “number 2 crime problem in America”, after violent crime (UNDP 
2011:44). In Russia, estimations have revealed that 56% of the health expenditure takes 
place through informal payments. Several years ago, the Wealth Health Organisation cal-
culated that 7.29% of global health (or approximately USD 415 billion) is lost to fraud each 
year (European Commission 2013:17). Such calculations highlight the fact that the perfor-
mance of the health system of a particular country is negatively affected and is instrumen-
tal in increasing existing inequities. This reality makes the study, analysis and dissection of 
corrupt practices and processes key in the fight against the phenomenon.
This fight is directly and indirectly related to comprehensive legislation, strong and 
independent judiciary, legitimate politics, solid and honest communication channels 
between politicians and the entire population and independent, accountable and 
well-trained anti-corruption agencies that is instrumental in producing better health 
outcomes (De Jaegere and Finley 2009:14–15; Knox 2009:119).
Corruption in health care affects general life expectation, infant mortality and especially 
under-five mortality rate negatively. Corruption in the health sector is directly related to 
lower levels of health expenditure in the gross domestic product, and poor health out-
comes (Vian 2008:87). There is a wide category of corrupt practices in the health sector 
such as theft, bribes, bureaucratic corruption and misinformation, supply chain and pro-
curement related purchases including pharmaceuticals, medicine distribution, services 
provisions by medical personnel and other health workers, quality regulation in services, 
facilities and product, for example, interaction between patients and health profession-
als, tax payers and hospitals, and hospitals and suppliers (Barr et al. 2009:226–227).
Having briefly looked at the general depiction of corruption in the health sector, a discus-
sion of both legislation and anti-corruption agencies in South Africa and India follows.
LEGISLATION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION 
AGENCIES IN SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa’s first democratic Constitution adopted in 1996 based its powerful pre-
amble on the promise of improving the quality of life of all citizens and to free the 
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potential of each person. This preamble was supplemented by Section 27 of the Bill of 
Rights of the Constitution that affirms the promise that everyone has the right to have 
access to health care services, including reproductive health care. The same section 
dictates that the State takes legislative and regulatory steps to realise the progressive 
realisation of this right. These fundamentals were supplemented with the promulgation 
of the National Health Act in 2004 that set up a number of parameters and frameworks 
of a uniform health system.
As corruption expanded since the dawn of democracy in 1994, the country’s gov-
ernment has introduced a plethora of anti-corruption laws, rules and regulations that 
tackle almost all aspects of corruption. The government is a signatory of the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Protocol against Corruption, African Union (AU) Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Corruption, and the OECD Convention on Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
There has also been the promulgation of key laws such as the Prevention and Combating 
of Corrupt Activities Act, 12 of 2004 (PRECCA), Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 
3 of 2000 (PAJA), Protected Disclosure Act, 26 of 2000 (PDA or The Whistle-blowing 
Act, Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2 of 2000 (PAIA), Financial Intelligence 
Centre Act, 38 of 2001 (FICA), Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 121 of 1998 
(POCA), International laws and the laws of Revised Public Service Integrity Management 
Framework, Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy, Public Service Charter, Charter for 
the Public Service in Africa (5 February 2001), Public Services Act, Proclamation 103 of 
1994 and Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, 56 of 2003.
A significant number of rules and regulations as well as official initiatives against cor-
ruption include the Code of Conduct for the Public Service, Code of Good Conduct 
for Supply Chain Management Practitioners, Financial Disclosure Framework (FDF), 
Asset Register for Accounting Officers, Financial Intelligence Centre, South African 
Police, Anti-Corruption Task Team, Multi-Agency Working Group on Procurement, 
Special Investigating Unit (SIU), National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), Specialised 
Commercial Crimes Courts, Asset Forfeiture Unit, National Anti-Corruption Forum 
(NACF), Inter-Ministerial Committee on Auditor-General, Public Service Commission, 
Government Departments, Public Protector, National public service anti-corruption 
hotline system (0800 701 701), Anti-Corruption Coordinating Committee (ACCC) and 
the Public Service Anti-Corruption Forum (Woods and Mantzaris 2012).
Amongst these laws, there are significant anti-corruption innovations in a number of laws 
such as the Companies Act designed to intervene and impact on the fight against the 
African Journal of Public Affairs52
phenomenon both in the private sector as well as in respect of supply chain and pro-
curement fraud, collusion, nepotism and political interference. These are planned to stop 
the proliferation of political and senior administrator’s interference in awarding tenders to 
businessmen close to the ruling party. (Mantzaris 2014a: 68–69; Mantzaris 2014b: 80–81).
Several of the newly introduced measures have followed the guidelines and recom-
mendations of the OECD in respect of the implementation of well-planned anti-
corruption initiatives and procedures, to aspire to corrupt activities. Thus, the South 
African health care companies in the private sector as well as public entities are le-
gally obligated to comply with the anti-corruption provisions of the Companies Act, 
(71/2008) and a series of regulations promulgated in 2011 including a number of other 
local anti-corruption laws, which include the Prevention of Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act (12/2004) and the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (38/ 2001). These 
regulations apply to all state organisations, listed public companies and companies 
that have in two of the previous five years scored more than 500 points in relation 
to Regulation 26(2). The score is based on the calculations as follows: one point per 
average employee number; one point per every R1 million in third-party liability; one 
point for every R1 million in turnover; one point for every person with direct/indirect 
beneficial interest in issued securities; and for non-profit organisations, one point per 
member or per association that is a member (Woods and Mantzaris 2012).
On the other hand, despite having been promulgated more than a decade ago, the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (12/2004), is harsh on gratification, 
one of the more common corrupt acts in the South African healthcare sector as well 
bribery that is classified as clear criminal acts. The Act is comprehensive and classifies 
a wide array of acts as corrupt and criminal, including those implicating South African 
and foreign government officials based in South Africa. It also addresses corruption in 
supply chain and procurement violations, public contracts, suppliers and agents, politi-
cians, administrators, members of the judiciary, sports events and games of chance.
There are harsh penalties for convicted corrupt individuals, including long periods 
in prison as well as substantial financial penalties for companies implicated in anti-
competitive collusion, bribes, gratification and other offences.
LEGISLATION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION 
AGENCIES IN INDIA
In India, the principal anti-corruption law is the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1988 that 
penalises corrupt acts by public servants related to illegal gratification, bribes and fraud.
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The Penal Code covers fraud and bribery issues and fraud matters, including those 
committed in the private sector. The Companies Act of 2013 includes a number of 
corporate governance provisions such as ‘fraud’ and bribery that is punished through 
increased penalties, introduction of anti-corruption mechanisms and audit commit-
tees including increased responsibilities for independent directors (Business Anti-
Corruption Portal 2016).
The Whistle-blowers’ Protection Act of 2011 protects whistle blowers from corrup-
tion, while the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act 2013 has created the offices of the Nodal 
Ombudsman for the central and state governments. The bodies investigate and adjudi-
cate corruption in India.
The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act 2010 has been promulgated to regulate 
the acceptance and use of foreign contributions by corporations and individuals. 
All such contributions need the approval of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Instances 
within which this is not done, such contributions are deemed illegal (Business Anti-
Corruption Portal 2016). The Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 sets the 
legal parameters against money laundering and carries strict penalties for violation 
of its provisions, including imprisonment of up to a decade including the attach-
ment or confiscation of property. India has signed the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption as ratified in 2011. It is also a member of the G20 Anti-corruption 
Action Group.
RESEARCH METHODS
The methodology followed was based on a mixed-methods approach that included 
primary research of documents released by the South African and Indian Treasuries 
and Auditor- General Authorities, unstructured interviews with researchers, experts 
and government officials in both countries as well as content analysis of the print me-
dia. The research was conducted in a triangular manner in that it combined a number 
of methodologies, methods and data collection techniques.
During the duration of the research, it was ensured that the participants from non-
governmental organisations, the private sector, government, and academia possessed 
adequate knowledge and expertise of the countries’ health care sector. This type of 
sampling selection method is referred to as the ‘judgemental’ type. The interviews 
with these groups that took place in their respective countries covered corruption in 
general, different types thereof including extensive organisational, sociological and 
politically motivated issues.
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The interviews were wide ranging and included processes to detect prevention of cor-
ruption; instances of personal experiences of gratification including the involvement of 
private sector suppliers; administrators or politicians; supply chain and procurement 
mismanagement leading to corruption and the repercussions in the delivery of health-
care. The data was coded and categorised after transcription according to the identi-
fied themes and commonalities. The content analysis of print media concentrated on 
the core issue of the research, that is, the health care terrain searching for a wide 
variety of concepts such as ‘political corruption’, administrative corruption’, ‘fraud’, 
‘gratification’, ‘suppliers’ legal persons’ and the ‘private sector’. The key words being 
‘health’ and ‘healthcare’.
The research utilised a wide range of variables including private and public sectors, 
provinces or regions, type of facility/establishments, type of actors involved (busi-
nesses, administrators, politicians, companies, medical staff, and healthcare staff).
FINDINGS
The findings are presented below.
India
The country’s expenditure on healthcare 2016 was 1.3 per cent of the GDP which 
was much lower than that of South Africa and this represented both the central and 
state governments combined. This implied that the shortage of more than 3 000 doc-
tors at primary health care centres in rural areas would remain unchanged (Budget in 
Parliament 2017). Such statistics become abysmal when dissecting the findings of the 
present research that revealed health care as the most corrupt service sector in India 
throughout the years (Interview with researcher from Centre for the Study of Law and 
Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 20 November 2015).
The key findings are summarised as follows:
There has been an intense debate for years that one of the root causes of corruption 
lies in the fact that the country’s health terrain is possibly the most reliant on the private 
sector in the world and very expensive for the entire population, more so the poor, 
including the over 800 million of the so called ‘underclass’ (Dutta 2012). Health care 
in the private sector can be described as highly advanced for those who can afford 
it but no access to the poor and the lower middle classes (Jilani et al. 2009:130–132; 
Bagcchi 2009).
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This reality is exacerbated by corruption at all levels.
The doctor-patient relationship: India’s doctors and hospitals operate openly in 
a clandestine way in a cycle of ‘referrals and kickbacks’ that line their pockets and 
alienates their patients (Interview with researcher Centre for the Study of Law and 
Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 20/11/2015)
The doctor-pharmaceutical collusion conundrum: The rampant corruption in the 
pharmaceutical industry operates through medical doctors’ collusion and bribery to 
prescribe particular drugs. Such corrupt practices are also evident in the direct col-
laboration between pharmaceuticals and hospital senior managers who collude in 
signing contracts prescribing specific medicines (Interview with senior researcher 
Jindal University 19/11/2015).
The pharmacist-patient relationship: The reported restraint and lack of trust of 
middle class and poor people by medical doctors in the private and public sectors 
has resulted in large numbers turning to pharmacists. The end result is that scores 
of pharmacy clients are sold inappropriate drugs over the counter at highly inflated 
prices (Dutta 2012).
Corruption in medical schools: Despite widespread poverty, there is a proliferation 
of private medical schools throughout the country that offer postgraduate training 
schemes at exorbitant fees that place students in profound personal and family debts 
and obligation (D’Silva 2015). These realities force them directly into the private sector, 
thus neglecting rural health for immediate and generous private profit through cor-
ruption (Times of India 2012). This is the only avenue out of poverty and ‘return on 
investment’. As it is almost impossible to get into government colleges, private colleges 
ask for once-off “capitation fees”, which are illegal and may exceed Rs10m (£100 000; 
€130 000; $150 000) (IBN Live 2013).
Facing these corruption challenges, the government has introduced the Uniform Code 
of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices that bans pharmaceutical companies from of-
fering doctors gifts, expensive cars and overseas trips and vacations (BMJ 2014). In 
the public sector, corruption has been so severe that the embezzlement of hundreds 
of millions of Rupees has in at least four states, especially Uttar Pradesh, on how the 
organised looting of government funds, has crippled the National Rural Health Mission 
(NHRM). The NRHM is a central State initiative launched in 2005 aspiring to improve 
the health of India’s downtrodden poorest citizens specialising in 18 states with weak 
public health indicators or infrastructure. Its key objectives have been to reduce the 
infant mortality rate and maternal mortality ratio (Dutta 2014). The country’s Central 
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Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has revealed that $2bn allotted to Uttar Pradesh was 
siphoned by successive state governments through corruption and never reached the 
people whom it targeted. Corruption has also all but obliterated the Indian drug regu-
lator, the Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO) that has been known 
to champion a wide range of vested interests because of its involvement in a web of 
corrupt systems and processes within the public and the private sectors (BMJ 2014).
The dominance of the private sector has led to a relentless cycle of corruption such 
as faulty drug prescriptions, sink test and kickbacks for referrals for doctors. The pro-
liferation of the so-called ‘public–private partnership’ (PPP) is perceived as an escape 
to mediocrity and corruption but lead to a complete commodification of healthcare, 
leading to a deterioration of the public health terrain (Economic Times 2014).
Recently these realities have made world headlines in the international press, newspa-
pers and magazines such as the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal including 
a wide variety of printed and electronic media (Times of India 2015). One of the key 
issues that point to the root cause of corruption has been the complete dominance of 
a vast privatised healthcare system that ‘pushed 39 million people into poverty every 
year from medical expenses’ (The Hindu 2010). The unregulated nature of the system, 
legal weaknesses and gaps and the fact that the corrupt elements are very rarely pun-
ished was presented as key elements of the perpetuation of corruption (BMJ 2014).
The newspaper content analysis in respect of the public sector revealed that corruption 
was described or perceived as the foundation of the lack of access to medicines (45%), 
shortage of other basic healthcare facilities for poor patients and shoddy conditions at 
hospitals and clinics (24%), unqualified and inefficient doctors (18%), spread of and 
no control of infectious diseases (8%), and incomplete treatment of patients (5%).
In terms of the private sector, corruption was covered in respect of healthcare profes-
sionals (primarily doctors) in unethical practices (fraud , bribes, referrals, nepotism) 
and huge medical bills, (55%), bribes by pharmaceutical companies, circulation of 
fake or inappropriate drugs, goods and equipment in the market (21%), corruption and 
greed in private medical schools (16%) and unnecessary medical tests (8%).
South Africa
Corruption in the sector takes different forms and a wide array of professionals, ad-
ministrators, politicians and sales people have been involved throughout the world: 
nurses, medical doctors, pharmaceutical sales-people and procurement middle 
managers, the empirical list is almost endless. Moreover, corruption also costs lives 
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when fake or adulterated medication is sold to health services, hospitals and clin-
ics (WHO 2000:28–30; WHO 2007; World Bank 2010:19–20). The South African 
health expenditure has reached 8.93% of the Gross Domestic Product. More than 
half of this amount is spent in the private health care, which implies that over 85% of 
the rest of the population rely on a corrupt-ridden and under-resourced public sector 
characterised by poor returns on health investment (Trading Economics 2016; Health 
Policy Project 2016)
The seminal research by Rispel et al. (2016) utilised a number of methodologies in 
the effort to explore corruption in South Africa, but the utilisation of statistics in a 
non-contextual manner proved unable to delve deeper into key issues of the problem. 
The researchers categorised and analysed the statistical realities carefully of combined 
provincial departments of health expenditures including unauthorised, irregular, fruit-
less and wasteful resources as described in the Auditor-General’s Reports. These are 
fundamental in abetting and amplifying corruption but the root causes evident in these 
reports were left untouched. The researchers present their findings with a conceptual 
and content analysis of the Auditor-General’s Reports that identify the root of corrupt 
behaviour, coalesced with existing scientific research.
This is fundamental as a Report by the World Health Organisation (2012:7–8) identi-
fies that the lack of efficiency and effectiveness in today’s complex, interlinked, rapidly 
changing environment leads to corruption. This implies that governments need to build 
capacity to operate effectively in complex, interdependent networks of organisations 
and systems in the public, private and not-for-profit sectors to co-produce public value 
(Greer et al. 2016:16–17).
There has been empirical research conducted in South Africa and Africa which gene-
rally deals with a wide array of governance, financial risk management and concerns 
including the devastating effects of corruption the negative effects thereof on the pro-
vision of health services (Mantzaris 2014a: 68–69; Mantzaris 2014b:82–83; Mantzaris 
and Pillay 2014:17–18).
The findings from the Auditor-General Reports revealed a worsening trend in audit 
outcomes with marked variation across the nine provinces. Key-informants indicated 
that corruption has a negative effect on patient care and the morale of healthcare 
workers. The majority of the print media reported on corruption was concerned with 
the public health sector (63%) and implicated provincial health departments (45%). 
The characteristics and complexity of the public health sector may increase its vul-
nerability to corruption, but the private-public binary constitutes a false dichotomy 
because corruption often includes agents from both sectors (Morris 2009:1353).
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Notwithstanding the lack of global validated indicators to measure corruption, inter-
national findings have revealed serious problems in South Africa’s healthcare sector. 
Corruption is influenced by adverse agent selection, lack of organisational mechanisms 
to detect corruption and a failure to sanction those involved in corrupt activities (Vian 
2008:85–86; WHO 2000; WHO 2007; World Bank 2010:23). The South African 
Auditor-General’s latest Reports on the National and Provincial Health Departments 
(Auditor-General 2016) describe a number of key issues that are instrumental in perpe-
trating a corruption cycle:
●● Inadequate governance systems with less than functional institutional capacity 
and inept personal competencies of governance, policy and implementation, 
role-players operating within and across institutions.
●● Blockages as a result of complicated policies as well as inadequate or inap-
propriate compliance systems.
●● Lack of proper political oversight realities in the sector and the relationship of 
state institutions and the private sector.
●● Lack of coordination of anti-corruption policies and agencies and their 
operations.
●● Existing relationships between sectors and state-led health services organisa-
tional efficiencies, deficiencies, financial and risk management systems.
●● Conflict/s of interest and nepotism are factors, which influence corruption.
●● Serious fraud, collusion and corruption in most instances occur amongst senior 
politicians and/or administrators.
These findings, that are political, sociological and organisational identify anti-corrup-
tion necessities that start with the political will to run corruption-free health services, 
effective government to enforce laws, appropriate systems, and citizen involvement 
and advocacy to hold public officials accountable (Integrated Support Teams 2009; 
Holmberg & Rothstein 2011:530–32).
Furthermore, the South African Treasury generally publishes detailed health budgets 
and financial information that it is difficult to understand not only for the citizens, but 
also the administrators themselves. This reality has immense consequences for corrup-
tion, especially in terms of financial systems operations, Supply Chain Management 
(SCM) and procurement and internal audits (Rispel & Moorman 2013:243–4).
In the private sector, corruption is rooted on a number of fundamentals that point to 
corrupt practices which need urgent attention. In most instances, South Africa as well 
as internationally private sector corruption is inextricably linked with the public sector. 
The private sector in the vast majority of cases are suppliers and service providers 
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are implicated in corruption in the public sector. This implies that the private–public 
sectors ‘collaboration’ of a corrupt nature is based on a combination of factors such 
as the political or administration connection, those in ‘advisory roles’, the collusion of 
dynamics and financial rewards (Woods & Mantzaris 2012).
There is evidence that the private sector health care operators (hospitals, clinics, doc-
tors etc.) determine the prices patients should be charged and this reality became 
public knowledge including questions such as what factors contribute to pricing. This 
reality was unmasked following the Competition Commission’s summonses to the mas-
sive Netcare Healthcare Group in the context of launching a market inquiry into the 
private health sector. In the process it appointed KPMG as an expert. Immediately, the 
Healthcare Group proceeded legally in a High Court case to protect its confidential 
information from being disclosed by the auditing firm to the Competition Commission 
(Interview with senior member of the Competition Commission).
It has become a corrupt practice by private doctors and hospitals to submit inflated 
bills and/or false claims for treatment or tests to insurance schemes and medical aid 
companies to maximise their income. Nevertheless, certain respondents held that 
there is less corruption in the private sector because the health facilities are smaller 
and more manageable; there are more robust systems in place to detect corruption; 
and checks and balances have been implemented to monitor daily operations (Rispel 
et al. 2016:243). There have been many cases of healthcare providers (doctors, para-
medics, and physiotherapists) charging patients and clients for services not rendered.
Suppliers of medical equipment, technology or pharmaceuticals may influence pro-
vider behaviour by creating perverse incentives such as gifts or financial kickbacks. 
Funders, suppliers and providers may offer bribes to regulators to overlook failures in 
meeting statutory or contractual obligations or quality standards and specifications. 
Consumers could collude with providers to misuse private insurance funds (Woods & 
Mantzaris 2012; Rispel et al. 2016:240–241).
CONCLUSION
There are both similarities and differences in the healthcare corruption in South Africa 
and India. In both cases, this corruption is related to ‘cooperation’ of collusion be-
tween the public and the private sectors.
Corruption is deeply rooted on human power relationships as well as organisational, 
political and social realities that ultimately lead to lack of accountability, transparency, 
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fairness and commitment to the welfare of all citizens of the countries, especially the 
most vulnerable sections.
As these similarities and differences are evident in the article, it is understood that the 
wide variety of present corrupt practices are founded on political, historical, cultural, so-
cial and economic realities that need a thorough dissection if corruption is to be fought 
decisively at all levels. For the fight against corruption to become successful existing 
comprehensive legislation can only be implemented by an independent justice system, 
active civil society, and public trust on the prevailing political system and regime. Even 
these advantages are not enough if there is a lack of continuous communication between 
the State and the whole population. Corruption in health care is a direct violation of the 
human rights of billions of people as it has direct negative effects on infant mortality and 
especially under-five mortality rate negatively. While millions of children die because 
of corruption, political and business elites and sections of the middle classes in South 
Africa, India, BRICS, and the whole world are directly or indirectly involved in bribing, 
collusion, extortion, fraud, violation of procurement regulations.
There is no end of this vicious cycle is in sight.
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